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This article is about online hate speech propagated via platforms operated by social media 
companies (SMCs). It examines the options open to states in forcing SMCs to take 
responsibility for the hateful content that appears on their sites.  It examines the technological 
and legal context for imposing legal obligations on SMCs, and analyses initiatives in Germany, 
the UK, the EU and elsewhere.  It argues that whilst SMCs can play a role in controlling online 
hate speech, there are limitations to what they can achieve. 
 
 




This article is about online hate propagated via platforms operated by social media 
companies (SMCs), and it examines the options open to states in forcing SMCs to take 
responsibility for the hateful content that appears on their sites.  The focus will be on the US 
and Europe. The article explains the dilemma we face if SMCs are to be held responsible for 
user-generated content, particularly with respect to balancing freedom of expression with the 
need to offer protection from hate speech. However, this dilemma is not examined through a 
human rights law analysis by balancing specific freedom of expression restrictions with harms. 
Instead we examine the legal obligations and responsibilities imposed on social media 
companies as internet intermediaries in the wake of recent legislative initiatives in some EU 
Member States. In particular, we chart how the approach has changed from specific notice and 
take-down obligations to greater responsibilities of proactive measures. We contrast this 
“European” approach with the US approach under the first Amendment which would prohibit 
the imposition of such responsibilities. 
This article argues that regulation in Europe is moving away from giving SMCs as 
internet intermediaries immunity from liability for illegal hate speech towards a new approach 
forcing them to take responsibility for user-generated content, and imposing a range of 
obligations on them to proactively moderate and manage content on their sites. Furthermore, 
we argue that as a matter of principle, this approach can be made compliant with freedom of 
expression obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in a way 
that might not be possible under freedom of speech rules under the US First Amendment.  
However, we point to the concern that some of the pro-active measures, to the extent that they 
automate content moderation and management, do create particular concerns over freedom of 
expression, and therefore require particular attention.   
The growth of online hate has been exponential over the last few years (O’Regan, 
2018).  Although we do not have official statistics that can give us an accurate picture of the 
actual amount of online hate, several recent studies have found alarming levels of abuse.  For 
example, the Anti-Defamation League (2019) found that 37% of Americans had suffered online 
harassment, and that a third of these cases were as a result of the target’s protected characteristic 
such are race, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation or disability.  A report by Amnesty 
International (2019) found that an abusive or problematic tweet was sent to a female politician 
every thirty seconds and that black women were 84% more likely than white women to receive 
abusive tweets.  Meanwhile, a Canadian survey found that 60% of Canadians had viewed hate 
speech online (Association for Canadian Studies, 2019). 
There are a number of factors, however, that make the regulation of online hate 
particularly difficult (Bakalis, 2017; O’Regan, 2018).  For example, the sheer scale of the 
amount of online hate, the pseudonymity afforded by the internet, and jurisdictional issues 
when the perpetrators of hate and their victims do not live in the same country make this a very 
difficult area to police.  Particularly controversial is the issue of free speech which creates 
difficulties in introducing legislation to prohibit this sort of material.  In spite of these 
difficulties, governments across the world are coming under increasing pressure to do 
something about the problem, particularly as it is becoming progressively more obvious that 
this is a particular problem for minority groups. 
More recently, the focus has shifted onto social media providers and their responsibility 
for contributing to the dissemination of online hate speech (Cohen-Almagor, 2015; Laidlaw, 
2015).  Politicians and social activists have called on SMCs to “do more” to prevent the spread 
of hate speech, abuse and extremist content on their platforms.  While the discussion in the 
early 2000s mainly focused on the question of technological innovation and immunity for 
intermediaries, and a narrow tailored notice and take-down obligation, recently the debate has 
called for greater SMC responsibility, and concomitant with this, pro-active and much more 
extensive obligations to manage and monitor content (Frosio, 2018). 
The focus on SMCs has come about because of the growing realisation that policing 
online hate by law enforcers is virtually impossible because of the sheer amount of hate that 
appears online, and the recognition that SMCs are, therefore, much better placed to deal with 
this because they have a degree of technical control over their platforms.     
However, placing the responsibility on social media providers brings with it its own 
problems, and is not necessarily the quick, easy and cheap solution that politicians may hope 
for, particularly in relation to any proposal which aims to automate the process of removing 
hateful material.    
    Currently, in the US and Europe, SMCs are operating in a sphere that was predicated 
on the ideals of freedom from governmental regulation and laws.  Since the early days of the 
internet and the world-wide-web, there was an acknowledgment that platform providers cannot 
be treated akin to offline publishers of the information they allowed to appear on their 
platforms, as they lack control over the content itself (Murray, 2016; Bridy, 2018).   The 
Communications Decency Act 1996 (CDA) was enacted in the US in order to give protection 
to service providers from being treated as publishers or distributers of the content they hosted.  
This was followed in 2000 at the EU level by the E-Commerce Directive 2000//31/EC.   While 
the CDA gives absolute immunity to publishers (other than immunity from Federal criminal 
law), Article 14 of the E-commerce Directive bases immunity for hosting providers on a 
knowledge standard. Thus SMCs are shielded from liability only if they do not know (for 
example through notification or constructive knowledge) that they are hosting illegal content.  
However, the E-Commerce Directive states that no general obligation can be imposed on SMCs 
to monitor their platforms.   
In this context, the main way in which the pressure on SMCs has manifested itself has 
been in the form of voluntary codes of conduct such as that set up by the Working Group on 
Cyberhate convened by the Anti-Defamation League in the US, and the EU Voluntary Code of 
Conduct (2016). However, in the last two years political pressure has been growing and SMCs 
have been called upon to  “do more”.  Consequently, we have seen legislative initiatives 
moving in two directions: one type of legislation imposes standards for the speed and quality 
of notice and take-down, and the second type of initiatives have moved from mere take-down 
obligations to imposing a range of pro-active measures. 
Thus, in Europe, the tide appears to be turning, and governments are actively rethinking 
regulation.  For example in Germany, politicians were impatient with the apparent lack of 
action by SMCs in taking down content that is illegal according to German law.  As a 
consequence, the Network Law Enforcement Act1 was enacted in 2017 which seeks to impose 
a legal obligation on internet platform providers to act swiftly to remove hateful material from 
the internet. The French Parliament is also currently considering legislation that would mirror 
that of the German law.  Initiatives have also been taken in the UK and at the EU level where 
greater responsibility on SMCs is envisaged, and which will be discussed further below.      
 It will be argued that whilst there may be a good case for imposing some of the burden 
for the regulation of cyberhate on platform providers, in reality they are limited in what they 
can do.  We also have to be careful that any law requiring SMCs to remove or block certain 
types of online speech does not unintentionally confer on them too much power over what can 
and cannot be said online.   Instead, what is needed is a proper discussion about the regulation 
of cyberhate, an acceptance that SMCs are limited in what they can do, and the 
acknowledgment that in fact a multi-faceted approach is required.   
                                                            
1 Netzwerkdurchsuchungsgesetz, NetzDG 
The first section of this article will outline what technological possibilities are open to 
SMCs to control hateful content.  It will be argued that they are better placed to remove online 
hate than the police, but that there are real limitations to their ability to do this.  There are also 
problems with requiring SMCs to proactively monitor content. In particular the use of 
automated content moderation and reliance on private regulatory regimes may mean that 
perfectly legal content is taken down. The second section will locate the regulatory options 
within free speech concerns and will argue that the approach adopted by each country needs to 
reflect the legal norms of each jurisdiction.  The final section will look at current developments 
in a number of European countries and at the EU level and place them in the context of freedom 
of speech.  
To preface this discussion, two definitions need to be made at the outset. 
The definition of hate speech is contested but, for the purposes of the argument in this 
article, it will include content which is illegal under legislation aimed at outlawing speech that 
incites violence, hatred or discrimination against named groups. We take ‘hate speech’ to refer 
to a narrow category of material that is illegal under the law, thus distinguishing it from material 
that might express hateful content, but which is not in fact illegal.  It is also important to 
distinguish hate speech from general hate crime provisions which, at their most simplistic, can 
be defined as crimes that deal with behaviour that is already recognised as criminal under the 
law (such as assault), but which are aggravated because of the perceived hostility of the 
perpetrator against the victim based on their affiliation to a particular group.  By contrast, hate 
speech provisions are ones which criminalise speech on the basis of its hateful content against 
certain groups.   
Social media have been defined (Boyd & Ellison, 2007) as “web-based services that 
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and transverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within the system.” 
We define SMCs for the purpose of this Article as providers of a platform environment 
which allows users to upload content (“user-generated content”) in order to share and 
communicate this content with other users (whether they are a restricted group of contacts, 
everyone registered on the platform, or more generally with users searching content online). 
This definition includes major providers such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp, 
Twitter and Youtube, but also smaller providers. We acknowledge that there is a need to define 
more clearly between, on the one hand, messaging services, whose main purpose is 
communication among a limited circle of private users, and on the other hand, content-sharing 
services whose main purpose is the sharing and distribution of multi-media content which 
originates with users of the service. We adopt this wide definition not because of a normative 
argument about the scope of legal regulation, but for the reason that some of the laws and 
regulations discussed below have such a wide scope, and for the reason that this article 
canvasses the issues widely. The focus of this article is not a classification of different types of 
services and their functions, although we acknowledge that more research and 
conceptualisation is needed for the regulatory debate. 
What defines  SMCs is that their users entirely determine the  user-generated content, 
but the SMCs are in control of arranging the content through metadata and online profiling, 
and they control the methods and format of the users’ interaction (for example by having a wall 





2. What Can SMCs Do to Prevent Online Hate Being Disseminated? 
In order to be in a position to evaluate the recent initiatives in the field of online hate 
and platform liability, it is important first to outline what exactly SMCs can do from a 
technological and logistical point of view to curb the mass of online hate on their sites.  By 
delineating the parameters of what SMCs can do, it will be seen that there are real limitations 
to, and dangers inherent in, the technology available to them that are sometimes ignored by 
politicians when they demand that SMCs should “do more” to control online hate.    
In answering this question, it is crucial at the outset to make a distinction between re-
active content moderation and pro-active moderation.  With reactive moderation, content is 
only taken down after a complaint has been made to the SMC of a potential breach of 
community guidelines or law.  This is also known as notice and take-down.  Pro-active 
content moderation is where material is prevented from being posted, and before it has been 
notified by anyone.  
2.1 Re-active Notice and Take-Down 
Notice and Take-Down is essentially a reactive form of content moderation whereby 
SMCs react to notification by users, or organisations they work with, and take content down, 
or close accounts, groups or channels. Given that SMCs may be liable under the applicable 
national law unless they take down material expeditiously once they have been notified by 
their users, a number of SMCs, and in particular the tech giants, have set up notice and take-
down systems and procedures.  
Facebook has stated publicly that it had 7,500 reviewers in 2018 and had plans to 
double the members of staff working on safety and security to 20,000 before the end of 2018 
(US Senate Committee, 2018).  Youtube has been running a “flagging system”, whereby 
content flagged by users is reviewed.  In addition, Youtube has developed a “trusted flagger 
programme” which is a community of trusted users who have a track record of flagging 
content accurately, according to Youtube’s content guidelines (US Senate Committee, 2018). 
Youtube has described its trusted flaggers as organizations with specialist expertise, for 
example, in hate speech and terrorism, and that it expanded its trusted flagger programme by 
an additional 50 NGOs during 2017. It stated that it would have 10,000 persons working to 
fight content which violates Youtube content guidelines in 2018, and that it removed 70% of 
violent extremism videos within eight hours of uploading (US Senate Committee, 2018). 
One of the main challenges of notice and take-down is that for some types of content 
and communications this mechanism is too slow, even if take-down takes place within a few 
hours of notification. For example, on Twitter conversations develop and escalate quickly, 
and the impact of the content occurs very soon after the tweet has been published - practically 
in real time (O’Regan, 2018). Hence, for Twitter, the action it takes on notification is to close 
accounts, and it stated that until January 2018 it had closed 1.1 million accounts which it had 
classified as terrorist accounts. However Twitter also admitted that around 5% of its 
approximately 300 million accounts are fake accounts, many of which are automated bot 
accounts (US Senate Committee, 2018), which turns the take-down process into a constant 
fight against the hydra monster of ancient Greek mythology. 
But even assuming that SMCs take down content quickly and according to clear 
guidelines - say within one hour or 24 hours as has been suggested in the EU Proposal for 
terrorist content or as is the case under the German Network Law Enforcement Act - its 
negative impact may nevertheless already have been considerable as 1000s, if not 100,000s 
of users may have seen the content and it may already have been copied, reposted or 
retweeted to other corners of the internet, including smaller SMCs and hosting companies or 
companies who refuse to take action against illegal content (Commission Staff Working 
Document, 2018). In particular certain SMC applications, such as Facebook Live (live 
streaming of video) have led to irreversible online harm at the instant that the content is 
published.  For example the filming of the terrible terrorist attack on mosques in Christchurch 
in New Zealand, which, even though it was taken down within an hour of upload, had already 
been viewed 4,000 times before it was removed (BBC News, 2019). The Prime Minister of 
New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, has stated that she wants the Facebook Live facility to be 
changed, for example by incorporating a delay before the stream goes live, and she is urging 
G7 countries to take action to mandate such a restriction (BBC News (2), 2019). 
Furthermore, an investigation by the German newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) 
back in 2016-7 revealed how these content moderation systems work in practice: Facebook 
for example receives 46 million take-down requests a week, which means that its 4000 
reviewers have about eight seconds to make a decision whether to take content down 
(Süddeutsche Report, 2016). The reviews are outsourced to several service companies across 
the globe, where the reviewers usually work just above the minimum wage, and after two 
weeks of training have to review around 2,000-3,000 pieces of content a day, some of which 
is so heinous that it leaves them traumatised with the outsourced service company providing 
little in terms of psychological support (Guardian News, 2018). Some of the content 
moderators in their interviews with the SZ admitted that the time pressure and the nature of 
the materials is such that they have given up looking at the pictures properly. There are, 
therefore, serious questions to be asked about the protection of the employees of the 
outsourced services, and also about the quality of the notice and take-down process and 
decision-making (The Cleaners Documentary, 2018).  
Considering how complex and context-specific the assessment is, and considering that 
editorial decisions require careful deliberation, the take-down process has rightly been 
criticized even though the major SMCs have employed more staff and are working on 
improving their processes (US Senate Committee, 2018).  
Moreover, there are questions about the transparency of the internal rules and 
guidelines made by the SMC. These internal guidelines, according to which moderators take 
content down, were originally secret, but were leaked by the UK newspaper, the Guardian, in 
2017.  In 2018, Facebook published its community standards in response to that leak 
(Guardian News, 2018). Such transparency has also been demanded by the EU Commission’s 
Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online (EU Commission, 2017). Therefore, 
while notice and take-down is established as a mechanism, it continues to involve substantial 
challenges. However, even greater challenges are inherent in pro-active content moderation 
by SMCs, which we turn to next. 
2.2 Pro-active Prevention of Dissemination 
The second way in which SMCs can control their user-generated content is through 
pro-active prevention or dissemination where content is blocked as it is being posted and 
before it has been notified by anyone.  Frequently, technology aids this process and the 
temptation for politicians is to call for automation through the use of artificial intelligence. 
Owing to the sheer quantity of information posted and uploaded by users on social 
media every second (Youtube famously quoted the hours of videos uploaded every second as 
being 400 hours) and every day (there are an estimated 5 million tweets every day), it is 
impossible to monitor content or exercise editorial responsibility on a manual basis. 
Therefore, the only realistic way in which content can be proactively removed is through the 
use of artificial intelligence which filters material at super-human speeds and identifies and 
blocks material that is deemed unacceptable by community standards, or illegal under 
national laws.   
Algorithmic tools used for content filtering are extremely limited in what they can 
identify as the subject matter of a video, an image or a text, and are by themselves not yet 
matured to distinguish between lawful and illegal content (Ammar, 2019; UN Special 
Rapporteur, 2018). An illustration of this is that automated tools have difficulties 
distinguishing between an image of a medical operation and that of an execution, or to 
distinguish between different meanings of the same word (think for example of the Russian 
feminist activist band “Pussy Riot”).  Furthermore algorithmic tools currently cannot 
understand the context of the information before them, and therefore find it hard to pick up 
on parody, satire, irony or jokes.  They also cannot recognise the context where a user 
actively and explicitly criticizes an image or where they have reposted a quote. Because of 
this, there is a risk that automated tools may lead to the removal of counter-speech aimed at 
hate or even terrorist speech in a counter-productive way (Frosio, 2018). Since the legality or 
illegality of speech frequently turns on context, this makes automating the legal assessment 
extremely challenging, if not impossible. Moreover, for some types of speech the legal 
assessment depends on whether the information is factually true or not, so that extraneous 
information must be sought before a decision can be made. Finally, there is a risk that if 
content is taken down by automated tools without human review, important evidence of 
crime or items of news reporting are made unavailable to investigators or security services. 
Therefore, automated detection of new illegal content and its classification at present requires 
human verification (Commission Staff Working Document, 2018). 
Despite these shortcomings, the large SMCs have invested in automated content 
recognition and blocking technology, and so have governments, particularly in the context of 
material relating to terrorism (Wired, 2018). 
Facebook has stated that it proactively uses algorithms for text-based machine 
learning and hashes for matching images which have been previously identified as illegal 
online extremism (US Senate Committee, 2019). Once a terrorist video or image has been 
identified as illegal, such known content is taken down within one hour. 
It also stated that this automated technology proactively discovers more than 99% of 
Al Quaeda and IS propaganda material online before it was notified to Facebook (US Senate 
Committee, 2019).  Likewise, Youtube stated that it has invested in machine learning 
technologies and uses a classification system which pro-actively flags videos for human 
review as potentially extremist hate speech, and that this has enabled Youtube to remove 
nearly five times as many videos.  Youtube also uses image-matching techniques which 
prevent the re-upload of extremist videos (US Senate Committee, 2019).  Similar to the 
figures quoted by Facebook, Youtube stated that 98% of videos taken down were initially 
identified by algorithms, not notification. Twitter also stated that it has developed technology 
automating the recognition of terrorist accounts before they are reviewed by a human 
reviewer, and that in 2017, 90% of terrorist accounts were identified by these automated tools 
and 75% of these accounts were closed before anything was tweeted from them (US Senate 
Committee, 2019). The combination of artificial intelligence and human review has increased 
the quantity of illegal content removed and has sped up the process. 
Facebook, Youtube and Twitter have also invested in counter-speech initiatives such 
as the ‘Peer-to-Peer Challenging Extremism Programme’ and the ‘Creators for Change 
Programme’.  These initiatives address the filter-bubble silo problem whereby website 
algorithms target content to users based on behavioural online profiling and leads to users 
being caught in content which is highly selective and isolating (Pariser, 2011). They 
specifically target content critical of violent extremism and containing counter-narratives to 
users who seem interested in violent extremism and terrorist content (US Senate Committee, 
2019).  
However, a number of services exist (such as Telegram) which offer encryption to 
their users, which means that they cannot deploy automated content monitoring.  This makes 
the pro-active detection of illegal content impossible.  Moreover automated monitoring is 
challenged by the fact that terrorist organisations and organisations which spread online hate 
change their tactics and online strategies in such a way that it is more difficult to 
automatically recognise such content as online hate or terrorist content. 
Finally, Facebook, Youtube and Twitter have a shared database of hashes of known 
terrorist images and videos, which they use to filter uploads, thus preventing this content to 
be spread across their platforms. This technology creates a unique hash function or digital 
fingerprint against which other images and videos can be compared. Digital fingerprinting 
was first used for this purpose in the context of images of child abuse by the National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children which uses a technology called PhotoDNA to find known 
images of abused children. It has also been used for preventing the dissemination of images 
or music videos (for example Youtube’s Content Id) that infringe copyright. Now SMCs are 
deploying this technology to ensure extremist images and videos (for example beheadings or 
propaganda lectures) are removed and stay down (US Senate Committee, 2019).  
Thus, whilst AI can certainly be of some help in pro-actively identifying and 
removing illegal hate speech, it is clear that there are real questions over whether and how 
this kind of proactive content monitoring can be or should be achieved. There are two main 
arguments against automated, pro-active filtering without human assessment.  First, there is 
the argument that this type of pro-active filtering is ineffective, or even, in some instances, 
counter-productive (Ammar, 2019) . Such filtering may be counter-productive as it would 
remove content uploaded to steer would-be-terrorists away from extremist content.   
Secondly, there is the danger of the removal of material that is legal, and thereby infringing 
freedom of expression through excessive censorship.   
Summing up, it is clear that that there is a  huge quantity of heinous content about 
which users complain, which SMCs have enabled, and which they now find difficult to 
control.  There is a financial burden attached to this, but for the largest SMCs at least, it 
seems only fair that they plough more of their huge profits into protecting both users and their 
moderators, and that they share some of the resources with smaller or not-for-profit SMCs.   
The call for SMCs to take greater responsibility for policing their platforms has had 
some success in improving both notice and take-down, and has also led to investment in 
automated tools which can ensure the stay-down of images and videos, and can pro-actively 
detect online hate, and in particular terrorist content.  This has sped up detection. However, it 
is equally clear that artificial intelligence tools cannot completely automate detection and 
prevent the upload of illegal online hate in the foreseeable future, because of the context 
sensitivity of such materials and changing strategies of groups propagating such materials. 
While it is equally clear that using such tools may speed up the process of detection and 
action against known types of content, actual removal nevertheless requires human review in 
many cases. There is, therefore, still a question mark over whether it is indeed possible to 
gain control over the sheer overwhelming quantity of hate materials, and the use of 
sophisticated technology such as bots posting such material, or encryption by groups 
propagating hate.  
Politically it is convenient to call for artificial intelligence, machine learning and other 
technology to solve the problem, but the danger is indeed that this call brushes under the 
carpet the real complexity of the issues involved, including undermining freedom of 
expression and the question to what extent removal of content may have unintended, counter-
productive side effects. Therefore it is important to keep in mind the need to build in 
safeguards, such as demanding that content automatically detected is reviewed by a human 
reviewer, and demanding quality standards as to the training and support of such human 
reviewers.  
3. Putting the Regulatory Approaches into the Context of Internet Free Speech  
Having examined the technological capabilities of SMCs, this next section will situate 
the regulatory approaches into the context of free speech.  Regulation of online hate has often 
been opposed because of concerns about free speech.  This section will examine these concerns 
and will argue that the approach adopted by a state should be guided by its own cultural and 
legal stance on hate speech as well as by broader questions over internet regulation.  This is an 
important insight as the debate in this area has largely been driven by US First Amendment 
considerations.  This has distorted and derailed the debate, particularly in European countries 
which have established hate speech laws that do not align with the US approach on hate 
speech.  It is crucial that the US-bias in the debate is recognised in order for the discussion in 
this area to develop and evolve in a way that is more consistent with the cultural and legal 
norms of each individual country or region. 
Until relatively recently, the default position in relation to hate speech has been to avoid 
enacting any binding legal obligations on SMCs to remove hateful material from their 
platforms.  This default position has been based partly on the concept of ‘cyberlibertarianism’ 
which is the school of thought that believes that our concepts of traditional state sovereignty 
do not work in the virtual world, and so regulation of the internet is impossible and futile 
(Johnson and Post, 1996).    But it is also partly shaped by the US First Amendment view of 
the issue which does not necessarily fit with the legal norms and culture elsewhere in the world 
(Belliveau, 2018). 
In the US, freedom of speech is guaranteed under the First Amendment of the 
Constitution which states that ‘Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of 
speech…’.  (First Amendment).   Supreme Court jurisprudence has finessed and delineated the 
parameters of the right to free speech.  In relation to hate speech, the Supreme Court has ruled 
in a number of cases that hate speech is protected free speech, and states can only prohibit 
speech if it incites ‘imminent lawless action’ (Brandenburg v Ohio, (1969)).  In the case of 
R.A.V. v. City of St Paul (1992), the Supreme Court confirmed that any rules which prohibit 
the content of speech (such as hate speech) are unconstitutional.  It still remains possible, for 
states to prohibit speech if it constitutes ‘fighting words’ and thus incites violence.  It is, 
however, unconstitutional for states to create laws that prohibit any speech based purely on its 
hateful content.   
In addition to this, the Supreme Court in ACLU v Reno (1997) made it clear that 
internet forums and internet communication would not be subject to regulation in the same 
way as the mass media.  This case struck down as unconstitutional elements of the CDA 
which tried to limit the type of material that could appear on the internet to that which was 
‘decent’ because to do so interfered with First Amendment rights.  The more recent decision 
of Packingham v North Carolina (2017) confirms that SMCs are viewed as a protected area 
for free speech.  Whilst this decision has been criticised (Citron and Richards, 2018), it 
remains the law that SMCs cannot be subjected to legislation which purports to limit speech, 
and thus infringe First Amendment rights.   
From a US standpoint, the question of whether to require SMCs to remove hate speech 
is fairly straightforward.  As the US does not have hate speech laws, coupled with the CDA 
provisions which grant SMCs immunity from liability as confirmed by Packingham v Carolina 
(2017), for the US government to refuse to impose a requirement on SMCs to remove hate 
speech, tallies perfectly with the US legal approach to free speech (Belliveau, 2018).  Although 
some US academics have put forward arguments in favour of hate speech restrictions 
(Belliveau 2018, Waldron, 2012) and in favour of online regulation (Bridy, 2018,  Keats Citron 
and Wittes 2017), the situation remains that under current laws, governmental regulation of 
online hate speech is unlawful.  Given that most major SMCs are originally based in Silicon 
Valley, it stands to reason that US cultural and legal assumptions about free speech will 
predominate.  This is why the starting point for most debates on regulating online speech has 
been framed by free speech concerns.   
However, the starting point from a European perspective is different.  Under Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it is possible for a State to create a law 
that imposes a limit on our freedom of expression so long as under Article 10(2) this law is:   
… necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others …(Art 10, ECHR).  
In relation to hate speech, the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR) has 
developed a body of case law which outlines to what extent States can deviate from the basic 
principle of freedom of expression.  There is a line of cases that has advanced a relatively low 
level of protection for expression that has incited hatred against minorities (Pavel Ivanov v 
Russia, 2007) and gives States wide discretion when it comes to criminalising or prohibiting 
such behaviour.  Although there has been criticism of the ECrtHR’s approach because it 
appears to give less protection to some minorities compared to others, the basic point - that 
hate speech laws are prima facie legitimate - still stands.    
Whilst the ECHR does not set out a definition of hate speech, and neither does it compel 
the enactment of hate speech laws, it has gone as far as recommending that signatory countries 
review their domestic legislation to ensure that it complies with the need for hate speech 
provisions, and urges signatories to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination, which under Article 4 requires countries to outlaw speech 
that aims to incite racial hatred (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation 
on Hate Speech, 1997).  In relation to online hate speech, the Council of Europe’s Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist 
and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, goes further than the ECHR 
which ‘permits’ hate speech laws, by imposing an obligation on signatories to create laws 
specifically to combat xenophobia and racism generated through computer systems. 
Insofar as international human rights frameworks are concerned, freedom of speech is 
protected by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and under Article 19 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  Freedom of speech is 
fundamental according to these frameworks, but not absolute, and limitations to freedom of 
speech are articulated under Article 19(3).  In addition to these limitations, Article 20(2) of the 
ICCPR requires that any ‘advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” must be prohibited by law.  Thus freedom 
of speech is firmly part of international human rights law and set the outer limits of hate speech 
laws, but the wide acknowledgment of freedom of speech hides huge discrepancies in how free 
speech is balanced with hate speech (O’Regan, 2018). The USA in particular has entered a 
reservation with regard to Article 20 (2). 
Most European countries have evolved their own set of hate speech laws that are the 
result of their own political and cultural history.  As such, hate speech laws will vary from 
country to country such as in terms of which groups are protected by the laws, or how the ‘hate’ 
is manifested (O’Regan, 2018).  Nevertheless, there is a common core to these offences in that 
they attempt in some way to outlaw speech that incites violence, hatred or discrimination 
against named groups. Such hate speech offences, therefore, put the onus on European states 
to enforce them.  Since it is frequently impossible to locate and prosecute the speaker of the 
information, this immediately raises the question whether SMCs as gatekeepers should be 
liable. SMCs in the EU may be liable under relevant criminal laws if they have knowledge of 
such speech and omit to take any action under principles of accessorial liability (Coe, 2015).     
If we take the US position on hate speech as our starting point, this means that there is 
a justifiable assumption that the law should not compel SMCs to do anything about this material 
as to do so would impose unjustifiable restrictions on free speech.  Thus, if an argument is to 
be made for regulation to occur, we would need to put forward a very good explanation for 
why the material is harmful, and why it needs to be criminalised. Whilst some academics have 
engaged philosophically with this question (for example, Waldron, 2012) and researchers have 
tried to show the harm caused by online hate (for example Awan and Zempi 2015, 2016), it 
can be difficult to prove categorically a causal link between online and offline hate crime other 
than in the most extreme cases such as in terrorism-related situations.   
By contrast, if the debate were framed more from a European perspective, the question 
posed would be fundamentally different.  Given that the material concerned is already illegal 
under national laws, the question then becomes why SMCs should not be compelled to remove 
it.   
  This has led many to raise the question of whether SMCs should take greater 
responsibility for content on their platforms.  For example, a report by the UK Parliament has 
called for a special category of responsibility to be created under UK law which would see 
SMCs defined as something between mere ‘platforms’ and publishers, thus presumably 
envisaging greater responsibility than mere notice and take-down (House of Commons, 
‘Disinformation and Fake News final report’, 2019).  This recommendation has now been 
followed up in the UK Government ‘Online Harms’ White Paper.    This has outlined plans to 
impose a duty of care on SMCs to protect their users from harm (DCMS and Home Department, 
2019).  The appropriate legal status of SMCs has been explored in detail elsewhere (for 
example, Bridy 2018, Klonick 2018).   However, it is clear that the status quo is being 
challenged and in ways that do not automatically result in infringements to freedom of 
expression.   
It is important to recognise this difference between the US approach to regulation, and 
what could be broadly referred to as the European approach.  Failing to do so can mean that 
two important points are lost in the debate.   The first is that whether or not a state can 
legitimately impose legal obligations on SMCs to remove illegal hate material will depend on 
its approach to free speech as a constitutional right more generally, and hate speech more 
specifically.  Therefore, to oppose regulation purely on the basis of freedom of speech is driven 
largely by US First Amendment concerns and does not recognise the varying approaches to 
hate speech across the world.   
The second point that is often lost in the debate because of the emphasis on free speech 
is that there is a crucial difference between regulating legal speech and regulating illegal 
speech.  Any discussion about regulation needs to pay close attention to what is considered 
illegal hate speech under the law, and cannot be based purely on what might be deemed to be 
‘unacceptable’ content, but which may be entirely legal, and which it would not be legitimate 
to expect SMCs to remove.     
Thus, this section has shown that whilst freedom of expression concerns are legitimate, 
where hate speech laws already exist, imposing an obligation on SMCs to take more 
responsibility for content on their site is not controversial as a general principle.  However, 
how this is implemented in practice is crucial.  The next section will examine some of the ways 
currently being used to do this, or where proposals have been put forward to impose greater 
responsibility on SMCs.   
4. Options for Regulation 
So far, we have shown that SMCs are in a position to exert some control over the 
material on their platforms.  We have also shown that whilst freedom of expression concerns 
are legitimate, where hate speech laws already exist, imposing an obligation on SMCs to accept 
more responsibility for their site is not controversial as a general principle.  However, how this 
is implemented in practice is crucial, and overly broad provisions, or ones that do not 
sufficiently oversee the moderation process, could lead to too much legal material being 
removed.   
In this next section, we will examine two ways in which regulation of hate speech can 
occur.  The first is through self-regulation, and the second is through top-down regulation with 
an element of co-regulation (Finck, 2018).  It will be argued that self-regulation is problematic 
and not the appropriate way forward.  A better approach is through top-down regulation, such 
as in Germany and the UK, but in order for this to be successful, it has to be done in such a 
way that there are appropriate protections in place for freedom of expression.  We will also 
analyse the EU approach to regulation which appears to be moving towards a pro-active 
filtering model which will require SMCs to use automation, at least to an extent, in order to 
keep their platforms safe.   This approach is mirrored, in part, by the UK proposals in this area, 
and suggests that this is the direction in which regulation is moving.  This too will bring 
challenges from a freedom of speech point of view that will require particular attention to be 
paid to the balancing of the different interests in this area.   
  
a) Self-Regulation As A Public Relations Exercise And Its Impact On Free Speech- 
Really A Softer Option? 
To begin with, SMCs were reluctant to police the material that appears on their platforms 
because this interfered with their business model and the concept of net neutrality.  However, 
as it became increasingly clear that their users were concerned by the level of hate that appears 
on these platforms, SMCs could see that there were business advantages to being seen to take 
the problem seriously.  Even in the US where freedom of expression concerns are paramount 
from a legal point of view, research by the Pew Research Centre suggests that 80% of 
respondents are firmly in favour of SMCs taking responsibility for preventing abuse online, 
whilst more than half of respondents said that it was more important that SMCs created a 
welcoming environment than for people to have the right to say what they want online (Pew 
Research Centre, 2017).  From the SMCs point of view, there has, therefore, been a very clear 
business case for creating their own rules in relation to what material appears online (Frosio, 
2018).    As a result, SMCs, such as Facebook and Twitter, have published on their websites 
acceptable use policies and guidelines which are, essentially, self-regulatory tools to govern 
“objectionable content”.   An additional reason why SMCs have been keen to regulate is 
because it was seen as a way of avoiding governmental interference with their business 
structures.   
There have also been initiatives both in the US and in Europe to set up voluntary codes of 
conduct that SMCs sign up to, and which encourage them to remove unlawful material.  In the 
US, the Working Group on Cyberhate was convened by the American Defamation League 
(ADL) to look into developing the most effective responses to online hate and bigotry (ADL, 
2016).  They have produced a Best Practices report which tech companies are urged to 
voluntarily adopt.  As we have seen above, the EU has also published its own voluntary code 
of conduct which it periodically evaluates in order to test the efficacy of self-regulation.   
Whilst SMCs are not state entities, and so therefore not subject to First Amendment 
restrictions in the US, there are concerns that the size and dominance of these websites, as well 
as the central role they play in forming public opinion, effectively means that they control 
citizens’ access to speech and so if they block material that is not illegal according to the law,  
they are creating censorship through the back door.  This has raised serious concerns in the US, 
particularly amongst free speech advocates and internet libertarians who have strong beliefs in 
the importance of a free and neutral internet.  They worry that permitting SMCs to block 
material at will prevents freedom of expression and curbs innovation (see for example 
discussion in Citron and Richards, 2018).  This has led to attempts to impose network neutrality 
on SMCs through the Open Internet Order 2010 that purported to prohibit SMCs from blocking 
any material that passes through their website.  However, in the landmark case of Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (2014) the Court of Appeal 
invalidated certain aspects of the Order and effectively ruled that SMCs could block material 
on their websites.  Whilst Verizon does now allow SMCs legally to apply their community 
standards, a debate continues to rage in the US over whether network neutrality should also 
apply to them.  More recently, the Democrats have introduced the ‘Save the Internet Act 2019’ 
in a bid to restore aspects of the Order.  At the time of writing, this has successfully been passed 
by the House of Representatives but awaits its fate in the Senate.   
 This issue is compounded by two further problematic aspects of these guidelines.  Whilst 
SMCs, such as Facebook, are willing to adapt their moderation process at the regional level in 
order to include material that happens to be illegal in a particular country (Klonick, 2018), their 
terms of service which apply to material which is not necessarily illegal, take effect 
globally.  To the extent that the balance is made in the US headquarters of the companies 
concerned, there is an allegation of US dominance. For example, Facebook seems to be more 
obsessed with nudity than depictions of extreme violence, a critique which was made in the 
wake of it taking down an iconic image of a nine-year old girl running away from a napalm 
attack during the Vietnam War for the reason that it showed “fully nude genitalia”.  Secondly, 
while the guidelines have now been published, they contain, by necessity, general principles 
which are abstract and whose application in a particular case are opaque.  
Thus, whilst voluntary codes might be viewed as a cheap and fairly easy solution to the 
problem of online hate, and one which avoids fully fledged legislation, it does give SMCs a 
great deal of power over what appears online.  Whilst freedom of speech advocates have been 
very critical of proposals in favour of  governmental regulation of SMCs, this seems to miss 
the point that without governmental oversight, self-regulation by the SMCs themselves runs 
the risk of over-moderation.  This potentially poses a bigger risk to freedom of expression than 
a well thought-out regulatory framework which would limit content removal to material that is 
unlawful.  Furthermore, self-regulation by itself is also not entirely suitable because platform 
providers are motivated by their own financial and business interests, and thus self-regulation 
lacks transparency and legitimacy insofar as the public interest is concerned. 
b) Legislative Interventions 
As a result of some of the problems associated with self-regulation, some countries 
have opted for a legislative approach.  Germany was the first country to impose fines on 
SMCs for failing to remove illegal material quickly enough (Frosio, 2018).  The French 
Parliament has followed suit, and at the time of writing, the French lower house of Parliament 
has voted in favour of introducing similar provisions in France whereby SMCs will be fined 
for not removing flagged content within 24 hours.  Austria has opted not to hold SMCs 
responsible for the content that appears on their platforms, but instead proposes to impose an 
obligation on them to verify their users’ identity so that they can be traced if they post hate 
speech anonymously.  More recently, the UK has put forward proposals for a systematic 
approach to the regulation of SMCs that differs from the approach adopted in Germany and 
France.  This section will consider the German and UK approaches in more detail. 
In April 2019, the UK Government published a White Paper setting out its intention 
to introduce a legislative framework for minimising the dissemination of ‘online harms’ on 
social media.  The White Paper deals with a broad spectrum of ‘online harms’ including 
pornography, terrorist content and child sexual exploitation.  Hate speech is not included in 
the list of online harms, although it can be assumed that the paper has included this with ‘hate 
crime’ which is within the ambit of the proposals (UK White Paper, 2019). The current UK 
Government has debated for a while as to how to tackle ‘harmful’ content on social media 
sites.  The White Paper proposes to require technology firms to sign up to a number of Codes 
of Practice, which impose obligations on SMCs to police content on their site.  It is also 
proposed that a new statutory duty of care will be imposed on SMCs, and that a new regulator 
will be created.  This regulator will have the power to fine and issue sanctions against senior 
executives, and the power to disrupt through the obligations imposed on ancillary services 
such as search engines and payment providers, and to order blocking at internet access level 
(UK White Paper, 2019). Thus the UK White Paper goes far beyond a notice and take-down 
obligation for SMCs as hosting providers and will impose a variety of obligations both on 
SMCs themselves as well as third parties.  SMCs themselves will have an obligation to take 
pro-active measures to police their sites by using automated filtering and content recognition 
technologies. Both the vagueness of the regulations imposed by the regulator and the breadth 
of the scope of measures and the fact that these measures will apply not only to illegal 
content, but also to “unacceptable” content causes great concern about freedom of expression.  
Although the White Paper does mention safeguards such as  transparency, accountability and 
complaints procedures, these may not be sufficient.   
Whilst it is not surprising in the current climate that the UK government is seeking to 
impose legal obligations on SMCs to ensure that illegal content does not appear on their sites, 
it is concerning that the White Paper is not precise in its treatment of hate speech.  To begin 
with, it is particularly problematic that ‘hate speech’ is, we assume, simply subsumed into the 
category of ‘hate crime’ without any recognition of the different issues relating to the two in 
this context.  Whilst ‘hate crime’ can be used as a broad category that can include ‘hate 
speech’, it is important to understand that in this context, ‘hate speech’ is different to other 
‘hate crimes’ in one important respect.  Hate speech is characterised by the fact that it makes 
certain types of speech illegal based on its content , whereas, generally speaking, other types 
of hate crime deal with behaviour that is already illegal (such as assault or criminal damage), 
but which is aggravated on the basis that the perpetrator was motivated by or demonstrated 
hostility towards a protected characteristic.  This means that freedom of speech concerns are 
central to any treatment of ‘hate speech’ offences, whereas of less concern in relation to other 
types of hate crime.  As such, in order to ensure that our freedom of expression is properly 
protected, SMCs would need very clear guidance on what material they can remove and what 
material they should not remove.  This issue is compounded by the fact that the statutory duty 
of care envisaged under the White Paper, would not only apply in respect of content that is 
illegal under UK laws, but also to “unacceptable content” that is offensive but legal.  The use 
of such vague terminology does little to assuage any fears that SMCs will find it more 
expedient to over-moderate in order to be sure they satisfy their duty of care, than to under-
moderate and risk breaking the law.      
While the UK proposals could be termed ambitious and all-encompassing, by 
contrast, the German Act focuses specifically on improving the speed and efficiency of notice 
and take-down and is therefore far more limited in scope. The German legislative proposals 
do not impose any obligations to pro-actively filter content as to do so was seen as contrary to 
the hosting immunity contained in Article 14 and the prohibition on a general obligation to 
monitor in Article 15 of the E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. Arguably the obligations of 
SMCs to monitor online content as imposed by the duty of care in the UK White Paper may 
conflict with Articles 14 and 15  (which may or may not apply to the UK by the time the 
legislation is enacted). 
In Germany, like the UK, politicians have blamed social media providers for 
contributing to the dissemination of hate speech online and have called on them to “do more” 
to prevent the spread of hate speech, abuse and extremist content on their platforms. In this 
vein, the German Minister of Justice, Heiko Maas, published a draft Bill on 17 March 2017 
which was passed on 1 September 2017 and came into force on 1 October 2017 (Network 
Law Enforcement Act 2017). In the speech introducing the Bill to Parliament, the German 
Minister said: “self-regulation by the relevant companies has had some success, but has been 
insufficient. New figures show: not enough criminal content is taken down and the processes 
are too slow. The biggest problem remains that social networks do not take seriously the 
complaints of their own users. Therefore it is clear to us that we have to increase the pressure 
on social networks. ….” (Maas Speech, 2017). 
This Act obliges SMCs with a user base of at least two million users in Germany to 
take down content infringing a list of certain provisions of the German Criminal Code within 
24 hours (for obviously infringing content) or seven days (where infringement is not 
immediately obvious), and provide an accessible and efficient notice and take-down 
procedure for German users, failing which companies may be fined up to 50 million euros 
(Guggenberger, 2017; Frosio, 2018).  This proposal was motivated by the perception of an 
unacceptable avalanche in hate crime, online abuse and fake news not being countered 
effectively by SMCs. The Act also introduced bi-annual reporting obligations on SMCs to 
enhance transparency about user complaints and take-downs, and to put in place a complaints 
procedure where users can complain about content which has not been taken down. In 2018, 
the independent complaints body received 8617 cases, but found only 3096 justified as 
content which should be taken down (36%). Only two percent of the cases of illegal content 
(62) related to racist online hate (Eco Annual Report, 2019). Thus transparency is one of the 
standards imposed by newer forms of regulation. However the German legislation does not 
force SMCs to provide granular reports on the type of speech which has been removed which 
would be required to assess the operation of the Act in practice (O’Regan, 2018). 
Whilst so far, SMCs have appeared to be judicious in their application of the law 
(CEPS Report, 2018), the fact remains that the primary obligation of the SMCs is to remove 
material rather than to protect freedom of expression.  The law itself does not highlight the 
importance of freedom of expression, and there appears to be no penalty imposed on SMCs if 
they over-moderate.   
The absence of clear protection for freedom of expression, both in the German Law 
and in the UK White Paper leaves those attempts open to criticism from freedom of speech 
advocates.  It is possible both to impose a legal obligation on SMCs to remove illegal 
material and to protect freedom of speech.  However, neither attempt analysed here has done 
so with the necessary rigour and force.  
 
c) EU Law Shifting Away from Intermediary Immunity by Imposing 
Technological Monitoring Obligations 
As has already been observed, until about 2016 the main approach for dealing with 
illegal content on SMCs’ sites was reliance on self-regulatory Codes of Conduct. At the EU 
level, this manifested itself in the EU Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech 
online which was initiated by the Commission and which was initially joined by Facebook, 
Microsoft, Youtube and Twitter, with more SMCs joining in 2018. The EU Commission 
claims in its 4th Monitoring Round of the operation of this self-regulatory Code of Conduct 
that 89% of content flagged/reported was reviewed within 24 hours and that 72% of content 
alleged by users and relevant organisations to be illegal hate speech was actually removed 
(EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, 2019).  More specifically, 
Youtube removed 85% of such content, Facebook 82%, but Twitter only 44%. As to 
feedback to users and transparency, on average 65% of user notification received feedback 
from the relevant SMC: Facebook 93%, Twitter 60% and Youtube only in 25% of 
notifications. The reason for this may be that Youtube is placing reliance on its trusted 
flaggers programme to which it provides feedback, but not to normal users. Google+ does not 
provide any feedback in response to notifications (EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers 
and Gender Equality, 2019). 
However, the recent spate of terror attacks within the EU has changed the purely self-
regulatory, laissez-faire approach, and this change is beginning to be reflected in EU 
instruments countering illegal content.  While EU law prevents Member States from 
imposing liability for illegal content on SMCs before they have actual or constructive 
knowledge of illegal content on their sites, authorities or courts can order intermediaries to 
prevent or terminate an infringement or establish a procedure for removing or disabling 
access to information according to Article 15 of the E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. Thus 
while the starting point is a general immunity for internet intermediaries, various EU legal 
instruments have recently qualified this immunity. As a result, while initially EU instruments 
in this area advocated self-regulation and abstaining from the use of automated detection 
tools, this approach is now changing with a move towards regulatory measures and the use of 
(at least partially) automated content moderation. 
The Counter-Terrorism Directive (2017) imposes an obligation on EU Member States 
to ensure the prompt take-down of  ‘online  content  constituting  a  public  provocation  to  
commit  a  terrorist  offence’ (Article 21(1)), and where this is not possible, they may provide 
for internet access blocking of such content (Article 21(3)) subject to transparent procedures 
and adequate safeguards (Article 21(3)). The Directive explicitly does not impose an 
obligation to seek out prohibited content, for example through automated means using 
artificial intelligence, but leaves the active policing of their platforms to SMCs through self-
regulation.  It also limits states’ legal intervention to ensuring take-down occurs (Recitals 22-
23).  This aligns with the EU approach to online media regulation in the latest reiteration of 
the Audio-Visual Media Services Directive (AVMS) (EU Directive, 2018), which included 
video-sharing platforms for the first time within the scope of regulation.  SMCs are included 
in the category of video-sharing platforms if the sharing of videos is not merely an ancillary 
or minor part of the functionality they offer (Recital 5, Art 1 (1) (aa)).  
The AVMS Directive envisages and encourages the drawing up of Codes of Conduct 
by the video-sharing platforms (Art 4a (1) and (2)), but it advocates a co-regulatory approach, 
beyond the self-regulatory approach. Member States must establish (a) regulator(s) to assess 
the measures taken by the video-sharing platforms themselves (Art 28b (5)). 
Firstly, Article 28b stipulates that EU Member States must take positive measures to 
ensure protection from three types of content. Secondly, the general public must be protected 
from user-generated videos and advertising that contains incitement to violence or hatred 
against a protected group (Art 21 and Art 28(b) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). 
Thirdly, the general public must additionally be protected from three types of content 
prohibited in EU criminal law instruments contained in user-generated videos and 
advertisements: (1) public provocation to commit a terrorist offence (Counter-Terrorism 
Directive, 2017), (2) child pornography (Directive on  Combatting the Sexual Abuse and 
Sexual Exploitation of Children 2011) and (3) offences related to racism and xenophobia 
(Council Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia 2008). Member States may 
impose stricter measures, additionally regulating other types of content, thus the AVMS 
Directive does not fully harmonise the standards in this area. 
Thus, the EU Member States, once the implementation deadline for the AVMS 
Directive has passed on 19th September 2020, have to take regulatory measures to curb online 
hate speech, terrorist content and child sex abuse material on video-sharing services. The 
AVMS Directive does not stipulate the precise nature of the measures to be taken by the 
Member States, but sets out the general principles for taking such measures which are similar 
to the principles set out in the UK White Paper. First of all, Member States should adopt a 
risk-based approach, being informed by the nature of the content and its harmfulness, the 
intended audience to be protected, as well as the interests of the video-sharing platform, the 
users who have uploaded the content and the public interest. Furthermore the AVMS 
Directive adopts a practical and proportionate approach which takes into account the size of 
the video-sharing platform and the nature of its service. Interestingly the AVMS Directive 
states that the measures should not comprise “ex-ante control measures” or “upload-filtering 
of content” in breach of the prohibition on the imposition of general monitoring obligations 
on hosting services (E-commerce Directive, Article 15(1)).  In other words automated tools 
based on artificial intelligence must not be implemented in such a way that they lead to the 
automated, overbroad filtering of content and general monitoring of all content.  This means 
that such tools must be supplemented by human review and the measures themselves must be 
specific and targeted, in accordance with Article 14 (3) of the E-commerce Directive which 
permits specific orders by administrative authorities or courts to terminate or prevent an 
infringement and which also permits procedures “governing the removal or disabling of 
access to information”. Under Article 28b, the AVMS Directive lists the measures which 
video-sharing platforms must implement by way of co-regulation, such as prohibiting the 
three types of content in their terms and conditions, providing for users the opportunity to 
report and flag such illegal content, providing transparent information as to what the SMC 
has done with content reported or flagged, providing age-verification mechanisms for content 
harmful to children, implementing content rating systems. parental control systems for 
content harmful to children, complaints handling measures and measures to improve digital 
literacy. Furthermore the AVMS Directive envisages the use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  Finally the AVMS Directive envisages further Codes of Conduct in respect of 
hate speech. While the UK may not be part of the EU in 2020, the UK White Paper strongly 
aligns with the approach in the AVMS Directive. 
A similar co-regulatory approach (Codes of Conduct coupled with an obligation to 
implement these standards by SMCs) has been adopted in respect of copyright infringement 
and this also means that SMCs have to use technological solutions to prevent copyright 
infringement (such as the prevention of re-uploading of proscribed content previously found 
through Youtube’s content id, or the closure of accounts) in the recent revision of the EU 
Copyright Directive, which has been similarly controversial (Reynolds, 2019). This 
Copyright Directive also forces SMC to take on more responsibility in respect of law 
infringements by user-uploaded content. 
Finally, the EU has issued several instruments on measures to effectively tackle 
illegal content online. The EU Commission’s Communication (2017) on tackling illegal 
content online outlines the Commission’s thinking in respect of achieving enhanced 
responsibility of online platforms for illegal content such as incitement to terrorism, 
xenophobic and racist speech, and child sex abuse materials and responds to the EU 
Council’s political calls for industry to develop “technology and tools to improve the 
automatic detection and removal of content” (European Commission Communication, 2017). 
The Communication states that SMCs should take pro-active steps to detect and remove 
illegal content through automated means, but that this currently requires final vetting through 
human review (which it calls the “human-in-the-loop” principle). The EU Commission points 
to the need to ensure notice and stay-down of illegal content, and in particular, the need to 
prevent re-uploads of the same known content by automatic means. 
Moreover, it points to the need for close co-operation between SMCs and law 
enforcement, but also between law enforcement authorities within the EU to achieve a better 
co-ordinated response and refers to the EU Internet Referral Unit at Europol as a model of 
EU co-operation. It points to the greater effectiveness of notice and take-down schemes using 
trusted flaggers (such as the IRU at Europol) and recommends EU-wide criteria and 
certification of trusted flagger schemes to prevent abuse of take-down mechanisms and to 
protect freedom of expression. Furthermore all users should have available convenient and 
easy-to-use reporting mechanisms. The Communication points to the need to preserve the 
evidence of criminal activity (and share it with law enforcement). Finally the EU 
Commission calls for increased transparency about the number and types of notices received, 
the time it took to respond to the notices, and any actions taken. In addition, the Community 
Guidelines and procedures for notice and action should be transparent, and the Commission 
recommends the availability of counter-notices contesting removal of content. 
The Communication was followed up with a non-binding EU Commission 
Recommendation (2018) on measure to effectively tackle illegal content online.  
Finally the EU has issued a Regulation for creating a harmonised system of removal 
orders for online terrorist content (EU Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist 
content online, 2018).  The EU Commission Proposal envisages a new removal order for 
terrorist content (any format, not just videos, but also images and text) on hosting services, 
including social media. This would apply to all hosting platforms, regardless of their size and 
introduce co-ordination obligations between the authorities of the Member States and 
Europol and sets as a standard that terrorist content must be removed by SMCs within one 
hour. The Proposal also provides that SMCs must use automated detection tools, but 
envisages safeguards, complaints mechanisms and transparency reporting. In particular 
Article 9 (2) currently provides that “Safeguards shall consist, in particular, of human 
oversight and verifications where appropriate and, in any event, where a detailed assessment 
of the relevant context is required in order to determine whether or not the content is to be 
considered terrorist content.”  Finally, it provides for the preservation of content taken down, 
in order to enable the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, or if content is 
found not to be illegal, in order to enable it to be uploaded again.  
Thus, it can be seen that both the UK and the EU approach are moving away from 
notice and take-down, and towards pro-active filtering.  This brings with it particular issues in 
relation to freedom of expression that will need to be at the heart of any such initiatives.  Coe 
points to the social media paradox - the fact that social media open up unprecedented 
opportunities for the free flow of speech, and thus user empowerment, but that this 
empowerment is equally dangerous and threatens individual rights and public disorder (Coe, 
2015). It is this paradox which calls for the finding of an appropriate balance between the 
protection of free speech and the prohibition of hate speech.  There are huge challenges ahead, 
and to steer a path that balances the different interests at stake will require compromise and 
cooperation.   
 
5. Ways of Tackling Hate Speech Other than Hard Law or Self-Regulation 
It seems clear, therefore, that whilst platform providers do have at their disposal the 
technology and money to do something to help combat online hate speech, there are important 
limitations to the effectiveness of these remedies.  Shifting the responsibility to third party 
intermediaries is a cheap and politically expedient solution, but it is important to recognise that 
it will not be a panacea.   
There are different types and levels of hate speech.  The motivation of the maker of the 
hate speech can range from the unthinking and thoughtless, to the purposeful and intentionally 
destructive.  The impact of the hate speech could be just as serious irrespective of the intention 
of the offender, however, it may make a difference to how SMCs deal with that behaviour, 
particularly when dealing with the makers of hate speech who are on the lower end of the 
spectrum of seriousness (Rowbottom, 2012; Bakalis, 2017). 
  Researchers have found that people behave differently depending on a variety of factors 
such as anonymity and incentives for good behaviour (Binns, 2014). For example, there is 
evidence that those sites which encourage anonymity have far greater incidences of bullying 
and hate speech (Binns, 2013). 
Furthermore one problem, is the “filter bubble”, which means that because of the profit-
maximising architecture of most social media sites, content is targeted on the basis of profiles 
of users’ interest as this maximises users’ engagement with the social media site and therefore 
advertising revenues (Pariser, 2011) But as a consequence, user groups are segregated into 
different groups, for example in relation to their political or religious identity. This in turn 
means that users do not challenge their own views and opinions against those of others which 
leads to echo chambers and increases the likelihood of users expressing hate. This again is a 
problem stemming from the architecture of social media sites. The major SMCs, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, have therefore launched specific counter-speech initiatives to challenge 
those users who seem to be interested in extremist content.  
Other potential ways of discouraging hate speech could be by allowing victims of hate 
speech to confront the person that has written something about them to explain why what they 
have said is harmful.  Or by encouraging the use of the technology that already exists on SMCs, 
such as Twitter, which allows users to block material from their view or to silence it without 
Twitter having to remove the offending material.   There are also preventative measures that 
should be considered, and which could be used to prevent unlawful material appearing in the 
first place.  For instance, codes of conduct can provide clearer guidelines to users about what 
kind of conduct is considered unacceptable by giving examples of the sorts of speech that can 
fall foul of the law.   
 
Conclusion  
Evidently, SMCs do have the technological know-how to help in the fight against online 
hate, at least to some extent.  However, the rhetoric in relation to regulation of online hate has 
tended to be dominated by US First Amendment concerns, which do not represent the legal 
culture in other areas of the world, such as Europe.  It is, therefore, legitimate for a state to 
compel SMCs to remove online hate if to do so aligns with its legal stance on hate speech and 
with its position on internet regulation more broadly.   
However, it is important that any attempt to do so makes clear distinctions between 
legal material (which should not be removed) and illegal material (which can be removed).  
Attempts to impose legal responsibilities on SMCs in Germany and the UK, while different in 
their respective approaches, fall short of this.   
Given that the EU position appears to be shifting towards imposing greater 
responsibility on SMCs, including the potential to require them to act proactively in relation to 
illegal material, this issue is pressing.  As well as some of the conceptual concerns identified 
in this piece about the difference between legal and illegal hate speech, the issue of proactivity 
and reactivity and the appropriate legal status of SMCs, we also need to consider whether there 
are other ways in which SMCs can be forced to act, for example by finding ways to actively 
discourage hate speech on their platforms through measures with less impact on freedom of 
expression.  Content moderation through technology is also a major concern for free speech as 
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